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This report by Arvind Kumar on “The Draft Indian Nuclear
Doctrine” is based on a Workshop held at this institute shortly
after the Government of India released the draft document on
the Indian nuclear doctrine in August 1999 for public debate
and discussion. The Workshop provided a platform for the
academics and members of the strategic community to exchange
views on the draft doctrine.
This report, I believe, is the first of its kind to be issued from
this part of the world. Achieving strategic autonomy and security
is the main focus of the doctrine as seen in this report. The report
examines related themes of the draft doctrine including no-first-
use policy and deterrence.
The Workshop was sponsored by the Regional Centre for






The Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine is indeed a remarkable
document. Released on August 17, 1999, it is the first time that
India has gone public in its security thinking and that too in a
major area of defence capability, nuclear strategy. Even though
it is a product of deliberation among a group of independent
specialists outside the Government who constituted the first
National Security Advisory Board, the thought process may be
considered as near official as would be feasible under the
circumstances. It could even be claimed to represent
Governmental view, else the document perhaps would not have
been made public in so short a time after it was submitted.
Releasing such a document to the public is important. For it is
only through informed debate and discussion that vital issues
such as security should be decided in a democratic country. Not
merely because it is a matter of high concern to the State, but
also because very substantial financial effort will be needed to
support the doctrine, for which again public support and
understanding become essential.
In its own quest for strategic transparency and to promote
dialogue and discussion on vital issues of the day, the Regional
Centre for Strategic Studies chose this topic as its theme for an
alumni meeting in South India. To the National Institute of
Advanced Studies and to its eminent Director, Prof Roddam
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Narasimha, the Centre owes an enormous debt of gratitude for
making this possible. The excellent campus, its idyllic setting
and befitting facilities and the eminent scholars on its staff made
the effort unique and fulfilling. Particular congratulations go
out to Arvind Kumar, a dynamic young alumni of the RCSS
and the coordinator of the South Indian Chapter, who took the
initiative and made this conference possible. The list of
participants at the end of the Book shows the high level of
participation, which in turn was reflected in the quality of
deliberations at the meeting.
The Draft Nuclear Doctrine states openly to the world India’s
security concerns and rationalizes in a straight forward and direct
manner India’s nuclear security goals and objectives. Logically,
policy on a nation’s security should evolve in distinct stages.
First, an analysis of the global and regional security environment,
followed by an examination of the nation’s interests and from
there determining the courses that best serve to achieve those
objectives. This may be termed as a strategic review and only
when such a process is complete should doctrines emerge to
determine the implementation of the agreed course of action.
Without a clue to the thinking behind the recommendations, the
doctrine stands alone, somewhat lonely and the debate gets
stultified. Certain assumptions are made and taken for granted
that would surely bear closer scrutiny and examination.
Many issues emerge from an examination of the doctrine. It is
to the credit of the conference organisers that these were brought
out in the open and discussed in a candid and constructive
atmosphere. India is too large and important a country to let its
security be dictated by outside powers or external influences. It
has to necessarily stand-alone and independently secure its
legitimate interests. The lack of a strategic culture and thinking
in the nation and a minimum awareness of global security
developments make this challenging task.  My congratulations
once again to the South Indian Chapter of the RCSS and to the
National Institute of Advanced Studies for taking this initiative.
The result of which is a very interesting and informative
monograph highly recommended to a wider public.
Dipankar Banerjee
Executive Director





At the dawn of the new millennium India faces major challenges
and problems that can be effectively met and solved only if it
revamps its approach to national security, articulates clearly on
identifying and advancing its vital interests and behaves as a
responsible, reliable and confident state. India needed a set of
guidelines on the nuclear front after it exercised its nuclear option
during May 1998. India articulated a set of guidelines in the
form of a draft Indian nuclear doctrine and released it in August
1999 for public debate and discussion on which future course
of action could be based.
The National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore  took
the initiative for raising the debate and discussion on a number
of important pertinent themes related to the draft document on
the Indian nuclear doctrine.
This report on the draft Indian nuclear doctrine was made
possible because of a generous grant made by the Regional
Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo. I am thankful
to Gen. Dipankar Banerjee, Executive Director of  RCSS for all
his help in this regard. I am also beholden to him for sparing his
time out of his hectic schedule and making invaluable comments
during the Workshop held here in November 1999.
x xi
I express my gratitude to the Director, Professor Roddam
Narasimha, whose support and guidance have been invaluable
in this endeavour. I am grateful to Professor S. Rajagopal, Head,
International & Strategic Studies Unit, for his constructive
criticism, analytical perception and thought provoking ideas
which inform this work. His constant supervision and helpful
attitude went a long way towards the successful completion of
this report.
Finally, I am thankful to all the participants who attended the




Report on the Draft Indian Nuclear DoctrineArvind Kumar
1
1. Introduction
On 26 and 27 November 1999, thirty experts, drawn from
academia, non-governmental organisations and government,
met in their personal capacities in the Workshop to discuss the
draft Indian nuclear doctrine. The meeting was hosted by the
National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore and
sponsored by the Regional Center for Strategic Studies,
Colombo.
The discussions focused on the following key areas:
Present status and focus of India’s strategic vision; Recent
trends in security thinking among the strategic community in
India; Does India need a nuclear doctrine at this juncture: If
yes, why? And if not, why not? No first use policy; its genesis
in the Indian context and relevance; notions of deterrence; the
need for a triad; and impact of the nuclear doctrine on
conventional conflicts.
The Workshop was divided into seven sessions, each beginning
with a few short opening statements from selected experts
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followed by discussion amongst the participants. The final
session comprised a brief presentation by the rapporteurs on
the discussion held on the identified themes and analysed
from an Indian perspective.
This report outlines the various discussions held during the
Workshop which basically culminated into a spectrum of
viewpoints on all the above themes. There was a great deal of
agreement on most of the themes among the participants. More
views were expressed than can possibly be printed here but it is
hoped that the general flavour of the meeting is represented in
this document and that minority views have also been given
adequate coverage. The objective of the Workshop was also to
provide adequate opportunity for young academics to deliberate
on such important issues in a transparent manner. A novel
feature of the Workshop was the presence of a number of active
duty military officers, pursuing advanced military studies and
on deputation to scientific establishments.
2. An Overview on the Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine
The draft Indian nuclear doctrine prepared by the National
Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and released by the
Government of India on August 17, 1999 for public debate
and discussion has evoked reactions all over the world. It was
considered important by the Government of India to come up
with a doctrine on nuclear issues and hence the task was
entrusted to the NSAB to formulate and devise some of the
principles on which the future course of action could be
based. The doctrine has also been regarded as the logical
conclusion of the nuclear tests India conducted in May 1998.
It is often stated that there is nothing new in the doctrine to
discuss. The viewpoint belonging to this school of thought
indicates to a lack of new thinking, and considers that whatever
Indian strategic thinkers have been arguing for decades has
been put together in the form of the doctrine.
The members of the other school of thought think that a
doctrine of this nature was an urgent necessity for India. The
reasons are that the nuclear weapon states are not committed
to global nuclear disarmament, and the current situation
prevailing across the Indian borders warrants such a doctrine.
Furthermore, it was the desire of the nuclear weapon states
themselves that India should come up with a nuclear doctrine
and end the ambiguity that they considered was characteristic
of the Indian positions on nuclear weapons.
It is correct to say that perhaps for the first time in the world,
India has taken a major initiative through making its draft
nuclear doctrine public. This is significant in the sense that
the Government of India has made everything transparent.
There are actually not too many countries which have published
a nuclear doctrine formally. The members of the nuclear club
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i.e. P-5 certainly have such doctrines. These countries, however,
have never published a draft doctrine and asked for people’s
comments on it. In the case of India, publishing a draft
nuclear doctrine for people’s comment is not only unusual but
extraordinary. It also affirms the self-confidence of India and
stresses that, as a nation state, it has made a beginning to
assert itself in some of these areas. On the other hand, it also
appears unusual in the sense that questions of security have
always been debated in the corridors of South Block and
perhaps in certain limited research institutions in India.
It was also felt by many that the publication of the draft
nuclear doctrine cannot be faulted. The doctrine draft paper
has laid down as principles, guidelines with which it would be
extremely difficult to disagree. However, there are a whole
range of areas and issues that arise regarding the question of
implementation, timing and resources in the country. It is
pertinent to note Bernard Brodie’s statement who said in 1947
that from then onwards, the purpose of the military would not
be to win wars but to prevent the occurrence. It was argued
that it is incumbent on India in the region to prevent war. It
was also believed and argued strongly that the use of nuclear
weapons during war cannot be ruled out. One should always
keep in mind the horrendous consequences of the use of
nuclear weapons in any eventuality.
Various comments have been made on the draft Indian nuclear
doctrine. It would be, however, necessary to understand the
meaning of the doctrine. The doctrine is basically an
enunciation of principles. It is neither a plan of action nor a
system of budgetary allocations.
The set of principles underlying the draft Indian Nuclear
Doctrine can be summarised in a few short lines.
Section 1.3 of the draft Indian nuclear doctrine says India will
“strenuously guard [its] right of autonomy of decision making
in the developmental process and in strategic matters in a world
where nuclear weapons for a select few are sought to be
legitimised for an indefinite future, and where there is growing
complexity and frequency in the use of force for political
purposes.” In other words the central motivation for the proposed
doctrine is strategic autonomy. This point is apparently not too
well appreciated or understood by the US and Western countries,
or even by many Indian analysts. Nuclear weapons are frequently
and widely seen as offensive, whereas the point guiding Indian
doctrine is the desire for autonomy. In this respect, the Indian
position is rather like that of France.
India’s stand is also unusual in another respect: it talks about
global nuclear disarmament (in section 2.1) even before setting
out the doctrine. Whatever comes later in section 2 is thus
conditional on the (unfortunately continuing) absence of such
disarmament. Given that there is no progress in that direction,
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India pursues a policy of credible minimum nuclear deterrence
towards potential adversaries. Section 2.3 says:
“India’s peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential
aggressor that (a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against
India shall invoke measures to counter the threat, and (b) any
nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive
retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable
to the aggressor.”
The doctrine clearly highlights that India will not be the first to
initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation
should deterrence fail. It makes a strong and categorical “no-
first-use” statement. It is, therefore, essential to say that the
draft doctrine is defensive and in fact, almost reactive. The
main aim of India is to preserve its autonomy. It was felt during
the discussion that India’s autonomy is now seen as being under
threat. India tried very hard to achieve global nuclear
disarmament and it has completely failed in achieving its goal.
The thrust of the argument and the inherent meaning in the
doctrine is that since India has failed in its mission of achieving
global nuclear disarmament, it took the step to weaponise in the
interest of ensuring its national security.
The document goes on to propose a policy of maintaining a
credible minimum nuclear deterrent for the country. A great
deal of discussion has taken place on what constitutes such a
deterrent, and how its acceptance represents a movement of
India away from its previously unstated doctrine (“unstated”
because it was not openly declared to the rest of the world),
called by various such names as non-weaponised, existential
or recessed deterrence by foreign analysts trying to guess
what the Indian strategy was by inference.
It was also argued that the concept of the deterrence as
mentioned in the draft text is nothing new. This concept is
certainly not something that has come after nuclear weapons.
Deterrence in India’s case means that the potential adversary
is discouraged from embarking on an attack by ensuring that
the consequences of such attack would be disastrous for the
adversary. Hence, it can be said that the doctrine is preventive
because it prevents the war. It was also emphasised that India
should be seen as capable of launching an attack on its
adversary if any eventuality occurs.
It is also important to note from the draft nuclear doctrine that
nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and decision for
use will be taken at the highest political level. The authority
to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the
Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor. It
particularly means that it will not be under military control
and will be strictly under civilian control.
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The question of the triad as mentioned in the draft text of the
doctrine was also highlighted. The draft document says that
India retains the options of using land, air and sea based
assets as a retaliatory action. It was mentioned that the
possession of the triad is basically a logical consequence of the
other principles that exist in the doctrine. They are inescapable if
other principles are accepted by India, namely, if the no first use
principle is accepted then it means that in a way the adversary is
first allowed to attack and may try to wipe out all nuclear
weapons. In this particular situation how would India be able to
assure that it would be in a position to counterattack? India
certainly would need missiles of some kind, aircraft and possibly
sea-based assets as well. The question may arise as to why India
needs all the three. The fact of the matter is that if India is taking
defensive as well as reactive posture then it has to be fully
equipped with all the required assets. Missiles, aircraft and sea-
based assets will be required because aircraft and land-based
missiles are vulnerable to first strike. The extraordinary
improvements in remote surveillance, with resolutions of less
than 1 metre now available from satellite platforms, make it
difficult to keep land-based assets from observation. The
possession of sea-based assets cannot therefore be ruled out, and
indeed is a necessity for maintaining credibility. This does not
mean that one maintains all three types of assets at all times. For
example the French, whose strategic motivation is similar to
India’s in some respects, have finally ended up with only sea-
based weapons, in a fleet of three or four submarines. But at the
present time it is not logical for India to give up any of the three
possible platforms. However, it was also felt that if the policy
has to work in the true sense of the term, the potential
adversary must be aware of the swiftness of an Indian response.
Concern was also expressed about whether India would be
able to afford the expense. It has already been mentioned
earlier that the doctrine is not a budgetary statement. The
doctrine also does not specify any time limit. It was argued
that India’s S&T and defence budget figures are by international
standards rather low. In the mid-90s (till Kargil) India spent
less than 2.5 percent of its GNP on defence every year. (The
historical mean has been about 3 percent; but declined in the
90s). If the statistics of the defence expenditure in India in the
last 20 years is studied then it is found that India has been
spending about 3% of its GNP on defence. It is only in the last
8 to 10 years that it has steadily declined. It was suggested
during the discussion that if India restores its allocation on
defence to roughly about 3% of the GNP, it may not be doing
something very different from what it has been doing
historically over several decades. Concern was also expressed
about the trends in the growth of GNP. Currently, GNP in
recent years has been growing at the rate of 6% and it is
expected that this rate of growth in GNP would increase and
reach a level of 7% to 8%. Hence, it is expected that if India
spends 3% on defence and the economy grew at 6% then at
the end of the 5 years, India would have 75% more money for
defence. The other optimistic projection was that if the
8 9
Report on the Draft Indian Nuclear DoctrineArvind Kumar
economy grew at the projected rate of 8% then India will have
2.5 times more money than now for defence after 10 years.
The other important point which was discussed is Indian
technology development and this is again something which is
not sufficiently understood domestically or elsewhere in the
world. It was argued that the development of technology in
India has been actually very cost effective. The technology
development projects in India are very cheap by international
standards. People quite often make a mistake when they take
costs from American sources and conclude that it is impossible
to achieve anything with low budgets. The total budget of
ISRO in 1998 was a little more than 300 million dollars. For
keeping 10/12 satellites in orbit, this figure is ridiculously low
by Western standards.
Some debate also centred on the background of the doctrine.
It was argued that India has been trying very hard to promote
and achieve global nuclear disarmament since its independence
in 1947. Time and again India has made proposals on how
disarmament may be achieved, but they have been usually
ignored, sometimes even dismissed with contempt. The history
of these attempts has been sad, tragic and frustrating: Indian
proposals have never been taken seriously. In 1995 the NPT
was indefinitely extended which indicated that the P-5 wanted
their monopoly and control to last for ever. Surprisingly,
Japan (which constantly makes strong emotive statements
about nuclear weapons, as they are the sole victims to-date),
has consistently opposed all Indian initiatives and resolutions
at the United Nations. By 1995-1996 India was ploughing a
lonely furrow, the rest of the world having somehow been
persuaded or forced to throw its lot with the P-5. The indefinite
extension of NPT showed that India’s efforts had been a wild
goose chase.
If one looks at the history of the development of nuclear policy in
India, it has been basically reactive, never aggressive. The Chinese
invasion of 1962 and their explosion of 1964 led to the first
reconsideration of India’s nuclear programme. The 1974 Indian
explosion at Pokharan was a reaction to the intrusion of the USS
Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh War of
1971. It is a well known fact that during the 1960’s and 1970’s the
United States Government made a number of statements regarding
the actual use of nuclear weapons and a number of nations were
bullied. Here is a statement from a 1995 Pugwash meeting: “ In
the last 50 years the use of nuclear weapons was explicitly threatened
occasionally, implicitly threatened continuously, seriously
contemplated more often than will ever be admitted and narrowly
averted more than once.” A former US Secretary of State (Alexander
Haig) has said, “Fission and fusion explosives are tools used daily
all over the world in US diplomacy.” Given this situation, a
country like India which considers preservation of its autonomy
essential had to react in a different way.
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It was felt during the discussion that many bodies at various
times have made statements about nuclear disarmament,
including the International Court of Justice, the Canberra
Commission, and a host of other distinguished international
groups. However, it is manifest from the response of nuclear
weapon states to these proposals that they do not take nuclear
disarmament seriously. Everybody knows that China supplies
nuclear materials to Pakistan, and has perhaps even conducted
a test for them; China also supplies missiles through North
Korea. But, China’s colleagues in the P-5 club have always
looked away. The P-5 moves on nuclear nonproliferation are
thus just not credible, and cannot be taken seriously. The US
continues to think that its security position requires a strong
deterrent, but others’ do not! Second, they are still unwilling
to subscribe to a no-first use policy.
It is generally believed that India is now making a departure
from its earlier policies regarding non-violence, as preached
by Mahatma Gandhi. It was felt that Gandhi’s views on non-
violence has not been properly understood by many. Gandhi’s
views on non-violence can be quoted from the ‘Gandhi Reader’
(1920). According to Gandhi, “if there is a choice between
cowardice and violence, he would advise violence ….. It is
preferable that India should resort to arms in order to defend
its honour than that she should remain a helpless witness to
her own dishonour.” Hence, it can be said that the draft Indian
nuclear doctrine does not represent a departure from the basic
Indian view. It is on the other hand a desperate attempt to
recapture a sense of national autonomy, which has been slowly
declining over the years owing to the policies of the P-5.
3. India’s strategic thinking in the new millennium
Most of the participants opined that India lacked a coherent
strategic doctrine in the past which they thought was unusual.
There was an absence of a well-defined and articulated threat
perception mechanism which quite often led to a very disturbing
situation. There was also a consensus among the participants
that till the publication of a draft nuclear doctrine, strategic
thinking was particularly absent and was ad hoc at best.
It was also argued that the Nehruvian era also lacked a
definite articulation of any doctrine. Discussions on policy
matters were restricted to South Block and a handful of
people. Strategic thinking in India never evolved after proper
analysis and assessment of the security requirement. Ambiguity
has been the hallmark of India’s policies in the last fifty years.
However, the participants felt that after India conducted and
exercised its nuclear options, there has been a perceptible
change in our thinking. It was argued in detail whether the
nuclear tests have changed the strategic thinking in India. The
publication of a draft Indian nuclear doctrine itself is a positive
sign of changed thinking in India. The Indian government
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made a number of statements after the nuclear tests which to a
great extent indicate consistent thinking and these statements
lay the foundation for a well-articulated strategic and nuclear
doctrine. These statements include a credible minimum
deterrence; a no first-use doctrine and non-use of nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear states; a moratorium on testing
and sufficient hints of not coming in the way of CTBT; and
willingness to participate in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
negotiation process at the Conference on Disarmament,
Geneva.
Despite the draft Indian nuclear doctrine not being a policy
document, it has articulated some of the postures on which
Indian strategic thinking could be based in the new millennium.
The nuclear postures mentioned in the draft doctrine are
discussed elsewhere in this report. Participants also felt that
strategic thinking is a highly dynamic concept that is open to
broad analysis and discussion. It was also emphasised that India
needs to have its own autonomous domestic and international
variables that would sustain its future policies and thinking.
There is also a need to build a mechanism based on institutional
structure which would help in coordinating national security
policy. It is expected that the new millennium may see a
quantum change in the security perceptions of India’s strategic
thinking. The publication of the draft Indian nuclear doctrine by
the Government of India has provided sufficient impetus for
public debates and discussions worldwide.
4. Notions of Deterrence
In the light of relations between India and Pakistan, and regional
security and instability, the role of nuclear weapons in the
context of nuclear deterrence were discussed. Discussions were
held on options of pre-determined/unacceptable damage in the
context of certain existing realities pertaining to India vis-a-vis
Pakistan and China. Dissuading an adversary from initiating an
attack because of certain retaliation inflicting unacceptable
damage or pre-determined damage has been the hallmark of the
different connotations of deterrence. Most of the participants
felt that the concept of nuclear deterrence has to be contrasted
with that of nuclear defence (i.e., the strategy and forces for
limiting damage if deterrence fails). Some believed that an
effective nuclear defence of missiles in hardened silos also
would have a deterrent effect by making it less certain that an
adversary could achieve a disabling “first strike”.
There was wide agreement that nuclear deterrence depends on
successful survival and an effective retaliatory strike. The
threat of retaliation is what prevents the other side from
launching an attack in the first place. If the retaliation is likely
to be devastating, then any potential attacker must weigh the
threat of retaliation against the gains of striking first.
India has committed itself to a “credible minimum deterrent”.
There was a general feeling in the meeting that India’s
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deterrence posture is not targeted towards any particular country.
However, it was felt that China and Pakistan are the main
concerns. It is not at all necessary to quantify India’s minimum
requirements. It is wrong and immoral on the part of the P-5 to
pressurise India on this account. It was argued that deterrence
requires Indian forces to be viewed by enemy leadership as
capable of inflicting unacceptable damage and thus effectively
deny them the option to use nuclear weapons first.
There have been varying opinions on the deterrence of the
cold war period. Some consider that the deterrence has worked
and some think that nuclear weapons are of ‘no use’ and in
reality have no value. Concern was expressed whether the
nuclear tests have succeeded in deterring the adversary or not.
There was a discussion in the meeting over Pakistan’s
statements on first use. India has committed itself to no-first
use of nuclear weapons, whereas, due to conventional arms
inferiority, Pakistan could use nuclear weapons first in a
conflict. Pakistan has made it quite clear that it will not sign a
no-first-use agreement. It was made clear that no-first-use
policy strengthens the concept of deterrence. The restraint
shown by India during the Kargil imbroglio is a case in point.
The principal purpose of acquiring nuclear weapons for India
is to prevent other major powers from trying to blackmail
India. The only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the
use of these weapons by others against our nation and block
the prospects of coercive nuclear diplomacy against it.
Generally speaking, nuclear weapons cannot serve any purpose
other than this.
Some debate centred on the linkages of nuclear deterrence
with arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. It was
also argued by many participants that the draft nuclear doctrine
is silent on the issues of chemical and biological weapons.
Others drew attention to the hypothetical situation where
these chemical and biological weapons could be used against
India and the failure of the deterrence strategy. The opinion of
some experts was that India needs to devise a definite strategy
in such an eventuality.
There was wide agreement that deterrence has a psychological
component. The meeting on the other hand also considered
that the no-first-use policy possibly has weakened the concept
of deterrence and there was a perception that it might lead to
an arms race in the region. The opinion of some experts was
that there is still scope for preventing full-scale weaponisation
both in India and Pakistan and perhaps the previous position
of nuclear ambiguity served the interests better for both the
nations. The potential for war between India and Pakistan also
formed a part of the debate. The disturbances perpetuated by
Pakistan across the border were a case in point.
The fundamental issue of how to deter aggression formed part
of the discussion. Some felt that the notion of deterrence as
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spelt out in the draft doctrine was not threat specific. How to
deter can be answered only in the context of who is to be
deterred. Obviously, the prescriptions to deter Pakistan and China
cannot be the same. While it was felt that since India has only a
retaliatory policy, the will to use nuclear weapons cannot be
doubted. But credibility is affected by the external world-view
that India’s second strike capability, especially against China,
presently lacks muscle due to lack of adequate delivery capability.
Even assuming that India develops an ICBM capability, China’s
head-start and plans to develop and modernise its nuclear forces
to counter the US could still fuel an Sino-Indo-Pak arms race.
Alternatively, the Indian force would lack credibility to withstand
a Chinese first strike. This argument was countered by the logic
that in case of nuclear weapons, the mere creation of uncertainty
regarding the success of a first strike was enough to deter an
adversary. For what political price could be worth the risk of
even one major city being annihilated?  India therefore does not
need to match any adversary’s development of nuclear capability
weapon- by- weapon, but must instead aim at a force structure
that is capable of creating and planting an element of doubt
regarding the success of the first strike.
5. No-first-use policy: Its genesis and relevance in the
Indian context
No-first-use (NFU) policy has been made one of the important
pillars of the draft nuclear doctrine. It is pertinent to point out
here that Indian nuclear policy has always been defensive,
even reactive. The Indian advocacy of a NFU with respect to
nuclear weapons dates back to 1978 when India introduced a
draft resolution on this subject at the United Nations General
Assembly. The draft also requested all States to submit to the
General Assembly proposals concerning the non-use of nuclear
weapons and the avoidance of nuclear war in order that an
international convention on the subject might be formulated
through further discussion and agreement. However, this
resolution did not receive any support from the nuclear weapon
states. NFU was also the basis of the Geneva Protocol of 1925
for chemical weapons, a principle where the aggressor
possessed the weapon and the victim did not. The famous
Rajiv Gandhi action plan (1988) which was presented to the
UN special session on disarmament also contained the concept
of NFU. Basically, this policy demonstrates restraint and
communicates confidence in one’s power to retaliate.
NFU was a hot topic for discussion with particular reference to
the difficulty that India might face in the existing security
scenario in the Indian subcontinent. It was explained that India
should not restrict itself to NFU in the existing international
scenario because there may be a lack of adequate infrastructure
for command, control, communication and intelligence systems.
There were differing perspectives on these issues.
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Some of the participants felt that the NFU will be a good policy
because the probability of an actual nuclear exchange goes
down and India may gain sufficient time to build or acquire the
required infrastructure in terms of e.g. ICBMs. India will also
have to absorb the first strike and should be fully equipped with
the second strike capability for this scenario.
There was, however, general agreement among participants
that even if India adheres to NFU, it will simply be an
undertaking, with no guarantee that it will be observed to the
limit. In any case, it cannot be an irrevocable declaration. The
policy can be changed any time that India wants to change it.
Some experts felt that NFU is certainly more than a paper
commitment and that under the NFU, India will be placing its
nuclear weapons in a “de-mated” posture. De-mating basically
means that the warheads would be separated from the delivery
vehicles (recessed deterrence). There was also a feeling that
the credibility of a NFU is very low when the strategic stakes
are high in the existing security scenario in the South Asian
region. India’s policy, to have the strength of a giant but not to
use like one, sounds ironical.
The majority considered the NFU policy as a sound pillar of
the doctrine, both politically and morally. It was also pointed
out that NFU is natural extension of India’s moral and political
stand regarding global nuclear disarmament. Some felt that
India must press for NFU treaty among the nuclear weapon
states as a major step in the disarmament process. China,
however, has been doing this but without success.
6.  Does India need the triad?
The triad (mobile land-based missiles, air assets and sea-
based assets) was a hot topic for discussion, with particular
reference to the difficulty that India might face in achieving
this in relation to its current technological status. Opinions
were divided on the necessity for a triad. One view was that
the issue of triad was not a doctrinal one and belonged to the
realm of nuclear strategy. The prescription of a triad in the
doctrine, according to this view, has merely raised fears about
the intended size of India’s nuclear arsenal. It has also reduced
the credibility of the force structure because of India’s lack of
demonstrated capability in producing the sea-based deterrent
and provided an avoidable point for critics to capitalise on.
Some felt a dyad would have strengthened credibility. Others
opined that the triad was an absolute necessity for second
strike capability and that the Indian scientific community can
positively face this challenge. Given adequate resources, India
could have a triad within a reasonable time frame. It was felt
that India’s geographic location also warrants triad capability.
(For details about the features and concept of triad, see
Annexure II).
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7. Impact of the nuclear doctrine on conventional conflicts
Bernard Brodie, a few months after the explosion of the first
atomic bomb, recognized that “thus far the chief purpose of
the military establishment had been to win wars. From now
on its chief purpose must be to avert them”. Brodie noted a
shift from the Clausewitzian notion of war as a political
option to the notion of war as the political objective.
This implied a reconceptualisation of national security. Before
the nuclear era, nations could find security by using military
force against each other. Now with nations arming themselves
with nuclear weapons, only devastation could be the result of
their use. The implication was that the approach required in a
nuclear environment to achieve security was vastly different
from the requirements for security in the conventional realm.
In the conventional realm, the struggle over power and search
for security occasionally required competition on the battlefield.
According to Brodie’s logic, that same struggle for power and
security necessitates avoiding the battlefield when nuclear
weapons are present.
The practices associated with conventional warfare are distinct
from the laws, theories and applications that should guide
thinking about nuclear conflict. In essence, there are two
definable paradigms of military security. One in which the
organizing construct rests on preparing to fight and win a war,
another in which war avoidance is the underlying goal of
military preparations. What is intriguing about the cold war
experience is that both the nuclear and the conventional
paradigms on war coexisted simultaneously. While super-
power relations were captured by the logic of the nuclear
paradigm, they were not immune from the applications and
thinking dominant in the conventional paradigm.
What does this line of thinking imply for India and its armed
forces? Today, a triangular nuclear situation prevails in the sub-
continent, Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak. Undoubtedly there is more
cause for concern in the Indo-Pak situation than the Sino-
Indian, due to the present state of political situation post-Kargil.
It is interesting to examine the impact of the nuclear situation
on the Kargil conflict. In terms of deterrence, one could term it
as a failure of conventional deterrence, as Pakistan exploited
the opportunity available by clandestinely occupying, unopposed,
the unoccupied and inhospitable Kargil heights. However, it
could be argued that the nuclear situation had emboldened the
Pakistanis, for they believed that it would prevent India from
taking any strong measures, due to fears of escalation into the
nuclear realm. However, this belief was apparently shaken
when India used air power and mobilized its forces. The fear of
escalation could therefore be an influential reason for Pakistan’s
capitulation and final withdrawal. However none of this can be
empirically proved and will have to await the unfolding of facts
at a later date. But the fact that the nuclear situation had
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induced caution on both sides is quite evident if one considers
India’s decision not to cross the Line of Control, in contrast to
the 1965 war when India reacted to large-scale infiltration by
opening another front.
It is therefore apparent that in the existing nuclear era, military
decision-making has to be increasingly concerned with political
ramifications. The fear of a nuclear war will influence political
decision making in conflict situations. Political leaders will
have to understand that military forces once unleashed develop
a logic of their own that cannot easily be contained. Escalation
will most likely result from inadvertence rather than from a
deliberate act. A conventional war snowballing into a nuclear
war is a real danger that cannot be ignored. It is impossible to
distinguish a conventional warhead on a missile from a nuclear
one. Conventional wars can also therefore be dangerous and
strong conventional forces should as far as possible provide
deterrence and help raise the nuclear threshold. The call for
strong conventional forces in India’s nuclear doctrine is
therefore justified.
Future conflicts between nuclear-armed powers in South Asia
will therefore assume forms that are within the Low Intensity
Conflict realm. Counter insurgency, local border wars and
terrorism will be the increasing form of warfare that the
Indian state will have to confront.
The discussion that ensued was focused on two issues. One
was for the need for strong conventional forces. The
overwhelming majority was of the opinion that India requires
strong conventional forces to defend against both Pakistan
and China. A vocal majority felt that substantial improvement
in the relations with China was possible. This became the
second issue. While some felt that India’s unresolved border
dispute with China was cause for future security concerns,
others felt that substantial progress was being made in Sino-
Indian talks and we could move away from considering China
as posing a major strategic threat.
8. Conclusions and Policy Options
There was unanimity among the participants regarding the
need for a doctrine. The majority however felt that the nuclear
doctrine should have been preceded by a comprehensive
security doctrine. The nuclear doctrine should then have been
its natural by-product. In the absence of a security doctrine,
the nuclear doctrine seems to convey that it is the fulcrum of
India’s defence policy, which it should not be. The security
doctrine should decide the balance that ought to be maintained
between nuclear and conventional forces. There is need to
take a prognostic approach with the consideration of alternative
scenarios.
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The majority view was that in view of the present state of
weapons inventory (minimum) there was no need for India to
imitate the West in the sophistication of their command and
control system. Some felt that even the response to a nuclear
strike need not be immediate and a hair-trigger alert status of
the system should be avoided. The fact that the command and
control system is likely to be the weakest link in the ability to
achieve a second strike capability was highlighted as one of
the most formidable challenges.
Participants pointed to the need to consider the indigenous
development of triad in a phased manner, and agreed that
India should equip itself with all the necessary modern
technologies which would be required in case of any
eventuality. The quantification of the minimum credible nuclear
deterrence is unwarranted. An arsenal can be kept to the
minimum possible only if its survival can be assured against
repeated attrition attacks. It was pointed out that the minimality
of the arsenal is related to its survival and hence there is
certainly a need for a strategic triad including sea-based
systems.
ANNEXURE - I
Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board
on Indian Nuclear Doctrine
August 17, 1999
Preamble
1.1. The use of nuclear weapons in particular as well as other weapons
of mass destruction constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and
to peace and stability in the international system. Unlike the other
two categories of weapons of mass destruction, biological and
chemical weapons which have been outlawed by international
treaties, nuclear weapons remain instruments for national and
collective security, the possession of which on a selective basis has
been sought to be legitimised through permanent extension of the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995. Nuclear
weapon states have asserted that they will continue to rely on
nuclear weapons with some of them adopting policies to use them
even in a non-nuclear context. These developments amount to
virtual abandonment of nuclear disarmament. This is a serious
setback to the struggle of the international community to abolish
weapons of mass destruction.
1.2. India’s primary objective is to achieve economic, political, social,
scientific and technological development within a peaceful and
democratic framework. This requires an environment of durable
peace and insurance against potential risks to peace and stability. It
will be India’s endeavour to proceed towards this overall objective
in cooperation with the global democratic trends and to play a
constructive role in advancing the international system toward a
just, peaceful and equitable order.
1.3. Autonomy of decision making in the developmental process and in
strategic matters is an inalienable democratic right of the Indian
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people. India will strenuously guard this right in a world where
nuclear weapons for a select few are sought to be legitimised for an
indefinite future, and where there is growing complexity and
frequency in the use of force for political purposes.
1.4. India’s security is an integral component of its development process.
India continuously aims at promoting an ever-expanding area of
peace and stability around it so that developmental priorities can be
pursued without disruption.
1.5. However, the very existence of offensive doctrine pertaining to the
first use of nuclear weapons and the insistence of some nuclear
weapons states on the legitimacy of their use even against non-
nuclear weapon countries constitute a threat to peace, stability and
sovereignty of states.
1.6. This document outlines the broad principles for the development,
deployment and employment of India’s nuclear forces. Details of
policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment and
employment of nuclear forces will flow from this framework and
will be laid down separately and kept under constant review.
2. Objectives
2.1. In the absence of global nuclear disarmament India’s strategic
interests require effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate
retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. This is consistent with
the UN Charter, which sanctions the right of self-defence.
2.2. The requirements of deterrence should be carefully weighed in the
design of Indian nuclear forces and in the strategy to provide for a
level of capability consistent with maximum credibility, survivability,
effectiveness, safety and security.
2.3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence.
In this policy of “retaliation only”, the survivability of our arsenal
is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic
environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national
security. The actual size components, deployment and employment
of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors.
India’s peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor
that :
(a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke
measures to counter the threat: and (b) any nuclear attack on India
and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons
to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.
2.4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the
use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity
against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a
nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should
deterrence fail.
2.5. India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not
aligned with nuclear weapon powers.
2.6. Deterrence requires that India maintain:
(a) Sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces,
(b) a robust command and control system,
(c) effective intelligence and early warning capabilities, and
(d) comprehensive planning and training for operations in line
with the strategy, and
(e) the will to employ nuclear forces and weapons
2.7.Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be
maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional
military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.
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3. Nuclear Forces
3.1. India’s nuclear forces will be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible,
and responsive to the requirements in accordance with the concept
of credible minimum deterrence. These forces will be based on a
triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets in
keeping with the objectives outlined above. Survivability of the
forces will be enhanced by a combination of multiple redundant
systems, mobility, dispersion and deception.
3.2. The doctrine envisages assured capability to shift from peacetime
deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time,
and the ability to retaliate effectively even in a case of significant
degradation by hostile strikes.
4. Credibility and Survivability
The following principles are central to India’s nuclear deterrent
4.1. Credibility: Any adversary must know that India can and will
retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and
punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear
weapons are used against India and its forces.
4.2. Efectiveness: The efficacy of India’s nuclear deterrent be maximised
through synergy among all elements involving reliability, timeliness,
accuracy and weight of the attack.
4.3. Survivability:
(i) India’s nuclear forces and their command and control shall be
organised for very high survivability against surprise attacks and
for rapid punitive response. They shall be designed and deployed
to ensure survival against a first strike and to endure repetitive
attrition attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a
punishing strike which would be unacceptable to the aggressor.
(ii) Procedures for the continuity of nuclear command and control
shall ensure a continuing capability to effectively employ nuclear
weapons.
5. Command and Control
5.1. Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at
the highest political level. The authority to release nuclear weapons
for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the
designated successor(s).
5.2. An effective and survivable command and control system with
requisite flexibility and responsiveness shall be in place. An
integrated operational plan, or a series of sequential plans, predicated
on strategic objectives and a targeting policy shall form part of the
system.
5.3. For effective employment, the unity of command and control of
nuclear forces including dual capable delivery systems shall be
ensured.
5.4. The survivability of the nuclear arsenal and effective command,
control, communications, computing, intelligence and information
(C412) systems shall be assured.
5.5.The Indian defence forces shall be in a position to execute operations
in an NBC environment with minimal degradation.
5.6. Space-based and other assets shall be created to provide early
warning, communications, damage/detonation assessment.
6. Security and Safety
6.1. Security: Extraordinary precautions shall be taken to ensure that
nuclear weapons, their manufacture, transportation and storage are
fully guarded against possible theft, loss, sabotage, damage or
unauthorised access or use.
6.2. Safety is an absolute requirement and tamper proof procedures and
systems shall be instituted to ensure that unauthorised or inadvertent
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activation/use of nuclear weapons does not take place and risks of
accident are avoided.
6.3.  Disaster control: India shall develop an appropriate disaster control
system capable of handling the unique requirements of potential
incidents involving nuclear weapons and materials.
7. Research and Development
7.1. India should step up efforts in research and development to keep up
with technological advances in this field.
7.2.  While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent
which is both minimum and credible, it will not accept any restraints
on building its R&D capability.
8. Disarmament and Arms Control
8.1. Global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a
national security objective. India shall continue its efforts to achieve
the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world at an early date.
8.2. Since no-first use of nuclear weapons is India’s basic commitment,
every effort shall be made to persuade other States possessing
nuclear weapons to join an international treaty banning first use.
8.3. Having provided unqualified negative security assurances, India
shall work for internationally binding unconditional negative security
assurances by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.
8.4. Nuclear arms control measures shall be sought as part of national
security policy to reduce potential threats and to protect our own
capability and its effectiveness.
8.5. In view of the very high destructive potential of nuclear weapons,
appropriate nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures
shall be sought, negotiated and instituted.
ANNEXURE -II
The Triad: Concept and Features
The triad represents the comprehensive development of the three legs of
the nuclear deterrent force deploying various systems, namely both land
and sea based missiles and bombers with a purpose of developing synergy
in action. The triad represents two important developments: (a) in terms
of diversification of the nuclear forces available in various modes of
deployment with the purpose of survivability and effective retaliatory
capacity, and (b) a tri-service role framework whereby the three armed
services are propelled to develop their respective platforms for deployment.
Such a purpose provides the three armed services coequal status in
nuclear decision making and participatory roles in nuclear operations.
The nuclear triad for India represents maturity in the evolution of a
credible operational framework that would integrate its conventional
forces with the nuclear deterrent. As the Indian nuclear doctrine evolves,
the triad would be the focal point in the identification of clear parameters
of escalation strategies from conventional deterrence to the nuclear.
The triad in its present form is at its infancy as the development of its
arms is being made and would finally present India with a true sense of
purpose, autonomy of action and a credible operations framework both
in peace time and in crisis.
Rationale for Triad
The triad relies on the following concepts that provide its rationale of
action.
Credibility:  The credibility of the triad imposes on the adversarial state
the full weight and potent capacity with sufficient nuclear weapons of
the defending state, the power and will to inflict unacceptable damage,
destruction and punishment should the adversarial state resort to nuclear
weapons in the first instance.
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Effectiveness: The nuclear triad is premised on the principle of synergy
among its constituent elements. The synergy of the triad relies on
reliability, timeliness, accuracy and the weight of attack of the defending
state against any potential adversarial state.
Survivability:  The prime advantage of the triad lies in its capacity to
survive a first strike. The first strike can be one of surprise and be
decapitating in scope. Should one of the legs of the triad be crippled in
such a strike, then the principle of survivability presupposes that the
other legs of the triad should be able to inflict a second strike against
the adversary.
Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence
and Information systems (C4I2): The C4I2 assets are considered vital
prerequisites for the survivability and operability of the triad. The triad
operates on the principle of integrated and coordinated C4I2 assets that
synergise and optimalise nuclear operations. However the C4I2 assets
are vulnerable to two threats.
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): Electromagnetic pulse is a form of
energy that is released from a radiational variant of explosions that
could cripple all semiconductor electronic chip based systems instantly
if a successful first strike is launched against the defending state. An
EMP attack can be an air-burst over the nation’s capital or the National
Command Post. Counter measures include hardening and immunity to
EMP bursts/explosions, and are considered vital.
Vulnerability to First Strike:  Surviving the first strike of a nuclear
adversary is vital to be able to launch a second strike. A first strike will
always target the C4I2 assets of the defending State. If the adversarial
first strike is successful by 50% then the quantum of C4I2 assets
destroyed would be substantial, leaving gaping holes in the defending
state’s C4I2 assets. Such damage would be difficult for the defending
state to recover from and retaliate.
The above issues are quite pertinent for India since India proposes to
adopt the no-first-use posture and relies on the premise of a minimum
nuclear deterrent.
Arithmetic, besides the issue of sufficient survivable nuclear forces in a
post-first situation, and the ability to prepare for a targeting strategy, are
issues of vital consideration.
C4I2 entails that India should develop a National Command Post (NCP)
that should be survivable so that the chain of command be intact despite
the first strike. If the nerve centres are all located in New Delhi and if the
capital is the target of a decapitating first strike, the level of vulnerability
rises in dramatic proportions. This has to be treated in correlation with the
proximal distances India has with its nuclear neighbours (Pakistan and
China) and the correspondingly short flight times of the missiles, and the
time taken to react in the form of a second strike.
C4I2 entails the dual key operational codes for the executive authority
as well as the missile officers. This is vital for all the three legs of the
Triad as this will prevent accidental launches and unauthorized use.
More importantly such safety procedures will be crucial during times of
crisis when inadvertent launches are possible.
Inherent in all these is the need for a comprehensive and extremely
reliable surveillance system that carefully detects missile launches, which
is crucial for this process.
As the Indian and Pakistan nuclear forces are in the initial stages of
evolution, it is vital that certain critical safety measures are adopted, such
as environmental sensing devices (ESD), permissive action links (PALS)
and insensitive high explosives (IHE). These technologies need appropriate
application because of their utility in enhancing nuclear safety.
C4I2 prepares the triad for a sequence in readiness. Apart from peacetime
deployment and de-alert, C4I2 with proper early warning provides the
triad sufficient warning for an impending attack.
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C4I2 assets also provide for omni-directional targeting options for the
triad.
Features of Triad
The following features of the triad highlight its comprehensive nature.
Land ICBMS/MRBMS/SRBMS:
l Full target coverage;
l High degree of accuracy;
l Assured ballistic penetration;
l Rapid re-targeting capability;
l Constant survivable command and control;
l Highest degree of reliability (98%);
l High degree of alert;
l Hardened silos/mobile launch possibilities;
l Camouflage/cold launches with silo refill capability;
l Post attack survivability;
l Quickest reaction time; and
l Low operating costs.
SEA:SLBMS/SLCMS:
l Highest degree of survivability (60% of focus at sea); submerged
presence;
l Assured ballistic/ assured target coverage by SLCMS;
l High degree of reliability;
l Ability to survive from initial attack;
l Invulnerable to detection or attack/camouflage;
l Survivability of forces on alert 30%;
l Recallable after take-off;
l Flexible targeting to include mobile targets;
l Targets of opportunity/multiple targets separated by long distances;
l Highest degree of accuracy; and
l Vulnerable to air defences.
Trends in the Nuclear Triad World Wide
Trends in strategy, technology and policy in the Post-Cold War period
show that the triad of the nuclear powers is being transformed.
French and British nuclear forces are now moving toward a two-leg
nuclear force structure. The Indian nuclear triad has to contend with the
impact of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) technologies and
their influence in the evolution of the triad.
The triad and the doctrine of deterrence are now faced with the prospects
of change and transformation world-wide. India should envision
possibilities of nuclear aging and with possible changes in the role of
nuclear weapons.
The triad has the prospects of modernisation and maintenance, and
technological upkeep is also a factor.
The role and the scope of tactical nuclear weapons in the future of the
triad and in India’s military strategy need examination. Modernisation
and technological innovation in C4I2 are crucial to the survivability of
the triad. The triad has to be linked with nuclear targeting options.
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ANNEXURE - III
Discussion on Questions from an Indian Perspective
What are the genuine security concerns of the West/P-5 ?
The views expressed on this question varied widely. It ranged from a
view that India should not concern itself with the concerns of the West
or P-5, and the question was wrongly phrased, to the predominant view
that the West would seek to perpetuate the status quo in terms of control
of resources and technology to facilitate the continued strengthening of
their clout in international affairs. Any steps to redress the existing
imbalance in North-South development that threatened the economic
and military balance would be cause for concern to the West. Regarding
P5, the majority opined that its main concern was the preservation of its
nuclear monopoly.
Is it in India’s interest to become a “Subsidiary State” of the US
Empire? If so, how should India go about it and at what costs?
The question was felt as insulting to Indian self-respect. One participant
felt that India could pretend to be a subsidiary State and reap the
benefits with limited compromise of national autonomy.
If India chooses to persist in its search for strategic, economic,
political and cultural autonomy, how should India go about it?
Self reliance and skillful diplomacy was considered the key to autonomy.
But there was need to recognise the limitations to autonomy in an
increasingly inter-dependent world. Autonomy must therefore be sensibly
interpreted within the framework of trends in globalisation.
Are there lessons from the French experience in India’s quest for
autonomy?
While some felt that the French experience could provide some lessons
for India, others felt that the French experience might not provide any
lessons to India because of major differences in the contextual situation.
France’s quest for autonomy was from an alliance system. India’s
contextual situation is different and its quest for autonomy is within a
regional and global system.
What are the roots of Western dominationism, how can India
handle it?
The general view was that the roots of Western dominationism lay in
their technological and military supremacy. This gave them a
psychological ascendancy and also leadership in vital areas. Some felt
that India’s handling of this dominationism must include adopting a
cooperative approach which would help in narrowing the scientific gap
by optimum utilisation of India’s scientific manpower. One view
expressed was that India’s quest for tackling Western dominationism
must not detract the Indian focus from the real and immediate concerns
of poverty alleviation, education, health and social inequality, and the
plethora of other problems that are required to be tackled urgently.
If the US were to weigh its Indian option versus the Chinese, what
would be its analysis? What are the pluses and minuses of the two
countries as the West perceives the option?
The US would view both as two important markets that they must have
access to, in order to sustain US economic interests. Ideologically, there
is closer affinity between India and US, as they are the two largest
democracies of the world. China’s centralised system of governance
makes it easier for it to implement reforms. The US therefore would
find it easier to deal with the Chinese in terms of achieving economic
results, whereas reforms in India are subject to political pressures that
are neither easily predictable nor suitably contained.
With the potential to emerge as an economic colossus and military
superpower, the US would also see China as a long-term threat to the U.S.
global interests. The U.S. does not perceive India as an emergent long-term
threat to their interests. On the other hand they could view India as a long-
term strategic ally. In sum, though relatively China would be economically
attractive to the US, politically India would be a better bet for the US.
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How can India propagate a more pacifist, non-dominationist world
view in the West?
Some felt that the NGO’s, the green lobby and the Indian diaspora were
the best medium to propagate a pacifist Indian image. Diplomatic
channels were also considered as an effective medium that must be
utilised fully. One participant however felt there was no need to get such
certificates from the West. Another participant felt that in the present
context, the best pacifist message that could be sent to the West was for
India to announce a policy of nuclear non-weaponisation.
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